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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
NASSAU LOCAL 830, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-24219 
COUNTY OF NASSAU 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (STEVEN A. CRAIN 
of counsel), for Charging Party 
LORNA B. GOODMAN, COUNTY ATTORNEY (NICOLE S. BOUTIS of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the County of Nassau (County) to a decision of 
an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) that found a violation of §209-a. 1 (d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when the County unilaterally discontinued the past practice of assigning 
County vehicles to certain employees of the County's Department of Public Works (DPW) who are 
represented by the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Nassau Local 830 (CSEA). 
EXCEPTIONS 
The County excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that the ALJ misapplied the record evidence 
and made erroneous conclusions of law. The County asserts that CSEA failed to meet its burden of 
proof. CSEA supports the ALJ's decision and argues that it proved its case. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASENO.C-5411 
VILLAGE OF SUFFERN, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the units found to be appropriate 
and described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-5411 page 2 
Unit I Included: Maintenance Mechanic I, Assistant Maintenance Mechanic, 
Chief Operator IIA-Water Treatment, Assistant Operator 
Grade 2A-Waster Water, Motor Equipment Operator I, Motor 
Equipment Operator II, Sewer and Water System Mechanic 
I, Auto Mechanic II, Sanitation Worker, Laborer, Clerk, 
Senior Clerk, Account Clerk/Deputy Treasurer, Senior Clerk 
Typist, Secretary/Deputy Clerk, Justice Court Clerk. 
Unit I Excluded: All other employees. 
Unit II Included: Assistant Operator Grade 3A/Supervisor, Maintenance 
Supervisor I, Motor Equipment Operator I I/Supervisor, and 
Motor Equipment Operator I I/Assistant Supervisor. 
Unit II Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to 
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any 
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: December 19, 2005 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
hn T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED FEDERATION OF POLICE OFFICERS, INC., 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5412 
POUGHKEEPSIES' JOINT WATER PROJECT BOARD, 
CITY OF POUGHKEEPSIE AND TOWN OF POUGHKEEPSIE, 
Joint Employer, 
-and-
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Incumbent/lntervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
Certification - C-5412 - 2 -
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Federation of Police Officers, Inc., 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties1 and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations andthe settlement of 
grievances. 
Included: Assistant Water Plant Operator, Water Treatment Specialist, Water 
Treatment Plant Operator II, Environmental Lab Technician, Sr. 
Water Treatment Plant Operator, Environmental Lab Director, 
Water Treatment Plant Maintenance Mechanic, Head Maintenance 
Mechanic, Water Plant Maintenance Supervisor, Water Plant 
Maintenance Mechanic, Sr. Water Plant Maintenance Mechanic, 
Heavy Motor Equipment Operator. 
Excluded: All others. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the United Federation of Police Officers, Inc. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
1
 See Town/City Poughkeepsie Water Treatment Facility and City of Poughkeepsie and 
Town of Poughkeepsie, 38 PERB 1J4008 (2005), affd 38 PERB fl3017 (2005). The 
Board determined that a joint employer existed and remanded the case to the Director 
of Public Employment Practices and Representation for further proceedings. CSEA 
thereafter determined not to participate in any representation proceeding. The joint 
employer and the petitioner agreed to the composition of the unit. 
I / 
Certification - C-5412 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: December 19, 2005 
Albany, New York 
Michael R.Cuevas, Chairman 
hn T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF 
TEAMSTERS, LOCAL 445, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5535 
VILLAGE OF WASHINGTONVILLE, 
Employer, 
-and-
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES 
UNION, 
I ncu mbent/l ntervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected.1 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
1
 The incumbent bargaining agent, United Public Service Employees Union, has 
disclaimed any interest in representing the existing bargaining unit. 
Certification - C-5535 - 2 -
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 
Local 445 has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive-representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and 
the settlement of grievances. 
Included: All employees regularly scheduled to work more than fifteen (15) 
hours per week in the following titles: Typist, Laborer (part-time & 
full-time), Maintenance worker (part-time & full-time), Dispatcher 
(part-time & full-time), Clerk (part-time & full-time), Secretary to the 
Planning Board, Secretary to the Zoning Board of Appeals, Deputy 
Treasurer, Chief Waste Water Operator, Assistant to the Village 
Justice. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 445. The 
duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times 
and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: December 19, 2005 /i/^, 
Albany, New York -^A^'^J^Ulx 
.-"2£>-s> 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SOUTHERN CAYUGA ADMINISTRATORS ASSOCIATION, 
- -Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5537 
SOUTHERN CAYUGA CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Southern Cayuga Administrators Association 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Certification - C-5537 - 2 -
Included: Regularly appointed full-time administrators in the position of 
Secondary Principal, Middle School Principal, Elementary Principal, 
Assistant Principal/Athletic Director, and Director of Pupil Personnel 
Services. 
Excluded: Substitutes, temporary, seasonal, part-time, casual, and all other 
- . - - employees. - - - -
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Southern Cayuga Administrators Association. The duty 
to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: December 19, 2005 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
Board - U-24219 - 2 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' arguments, we 
reverse the decision of the ALJ.1 
FACTS 
The record in this case consists of three ALJ exhibits, sixteen joint exhibits and the testimony 
of eight CSEA witnesses and one County witness. 
The instant proceeding was commenced by an improper practice charge2, sworn to on March 
27, 2003. The charge was amended, on the record, to correct the name of the charging party,3 to 
withdraw the allegation of a violation of §209-a. 1 (a) of the Act,4 and to withdraw the allegations that 
Gerard Keller5 and Walter Lipinsky6 were affected by the charge. 
The record establishes that the eight employees of the DPWs Division of Sanitation and Water 
Supply specifically named in the charge (Margaret Temme, August Eberling, Richard Kramer, James 
Gallagher, Edward Visone, Walter Henneberger, John Wetzel, and Emil Onolfi) were each assigned a 
County vehicle at times ranging from two to twenty-three years prior to the filing of the charge. The 
employees used the vehicles, to varying degrees, in the performance of work-related duties and to 
commute between home and their work locations. 
In February 2002, each of the eight employees received from the County a form entitled, "Use 
Authorization Affidavit - County Vehicles".7 The employees were to complete the portions of the form 
1
 37 PERB H4590(2004). 
2
 ALJ Exhibit #1. 
3
 Transcript, p. 9. 
4
 Transcript, p. 10. 
5
 Id. 
6
 Transcript, p. 199. 
7
 The title "affidavit" does not accurately describe the document since the employees were neither 
requested to swear to nor to sign the completed form. 
Board - U-24219 - 3 
that requested the reason for their vehicle assignment, the number of times the employee was called 
into work after normal hours during the preceding twelve months, and the reason for such call-ins. 
In January 2003, each of the eight employees received a memorandum from Peter Gerbase, 
the DPW Commissioner, advising that after a review of the employee's duties, it was determined that 
the employee did not qualify for a take-home vehicle. The memorandum directed the employee to 
surrender the assigned vehicle within thirty days and advised that if the employee disagreed with the 
determination, the employee could provide an explanation of why the employee qualified for an 
assigned vehicle. Six of the eight employees sought a re-determination, but none of the 
determinations was changed, and all of the employees surrendered their assigned vehicles. 
Each of the eight employees testified regarding his or her employment history with the County, 
the date when he or she was assigned a County vehicle, the name of the person assigning the 
vehicle, the conditions, if any, that they were informed of relative to their use of the vehicle, and 
whether their job duties changed during the course of the time that they had an assigned vehicle. 
The County produced one witness, Joseph Davenport, the Chief Sanitary Engineer and Acting 
head of the Division of Sanitation and Water Supply. Davenport is responsible for the supervision and 
direction of the Division's 450 employees, including the eight individuals named in the charge. 
Davenport testified about each of the employee's job duties and the extent to which each needed a 
vehicle for the performance of his or her duties 
None of the witnesses was asked about negotiations between CSEA and the County over the 
subject-matter of assigned vehicles or the County's vehicle use policy and none testified about those 
issues. The County's Use Authorization Affidavits that were completed by each of the eight 
employees, the appeals of six of the employees and the memoranda directing the return of the 
vehicles were received into evidence as joint exhibits. 
Board - U-24219 - 4 
DISCUSSION 
In general, an employee's use of his or her employer's vehicle for transportation to and from 
work is an economic benefit which may not be unilaterally withdrawn by the employer.8 For our 
analysis, the key word in that general statement is "unilaterally". 
While a "past practice" may be established by demonstrating that the practice at issue affected 
a mandatory subject of bargaining, "was unequivocal and was continued uninterrrupted for a period of 
time sufficient under the circumstances [citation omitted] to create a reasonable expectation among 
the affected unit employees that the [practice] would continue"9, a violation of §209-a. 1 (d) of the Act 
requires proof of the additional element of the charge that the practice was unilaterally discontinued, 
that is, was discontinued without negotiations. 
Here, the County does not dispute that a practice existed of assigning a County vehicle to the 
named employees that could be used by the employee to commute to and from work.10 However, the 
County contends that CSEA failed to prove its charge and even if CSEA proved a practice, the 
County is privileged to discontinue the practice since the vehicle assignments were conditioned upon 
the employee's need for the vehicle in order to perform his or her work assignment The County 
argues that for the employees involved either their work duties changed such as to justify the removal 
of the County vehicles or that the employee's duties never necessitated the assignment of a vehicle. 
The County's Answer further asserts that the charge failed to state a cause of action and now, 
8
 County of Nassau, 38 PERB 1J3005 (2005); County of Nassau, 37 PERB 1J3014 (2004) confirmed 
sub nom. Superior Officers Assn v Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 2005 NYApp. Div. LEXIS 13054, 38 
PERB H7016 (2d Dept 2005); County of Nassau, 35 PERB 1J3036 (2002); County of Nassau, 26 
PERB H3040 (1993), confirmed sub nom, County of Nassau v PERB, 215 AD2d 381, 28 PERB 1J7011 
(2d Dept 1995). 
9
 County of Nassau, 24 PERB 1J3029, at 3058, affg 24 PERB 1J4523 (1991). 
10
 See ALJ Exhibit #2. The County's answer 1J14 admits upon information and belief the allegation 
contained in 1J5.6 of the details of CSEA's improper practice charge. 
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additionally, argues that the employees involved in assigning County vehicles to the affected 
employees did not have the authority to make such assignment. 
The charge, as amended during the proceedings, fails to allege County unilateral action. That 
the charge was inartfully drawn does not permit us to infer facts. We have consistently held parties to 
their pleadings.11 
A review of the entire record fails to disclose any evidence, testimonial or otherwise, of 
unilateral action by the County. The only acknowledgement of this critical element of the charge 
appears in CSEA's opening statement where its attorney states, "This [assignment of county vehicles] 
was not negotiated with the union. I think there's an agreement on that".12 An attorney's argument in 
an opening statement is not evidence.13 Further, there was no admission, stipulation or other 
agreement in the record to indicate that the County agreed that it had acted unilaterally or without 
negotiations with CSEA. CSEA did not move to amend the charge to include this allegation, even 
though it had made other motions to amend its charge during the opening statement. 
The County's attorney used her opening statement to outline her theory of the case, which was 
based upon our decision in County of Nassau.14 From the development of the record, it is clear that 
the parties litigated this case with that prior decision in mind. In fact, both parties cite to that decision 
and urge us to take notice of its facts and holdings. The ALJ's decision to disregard that prior decision 
involving the same parties, some of the same individual employees, similar facts and a very similar 
issue was error. 
11
 See New York City Transit Auth, 31 PERB 1J3024 (1998). 
12
 Transcript, p. 13. 
13
 People v Musmacher^33 AD2d 352 (2d Dept 1987), Iv den 70 NY2d 802 (1987). 
14
 26 PERB H3040(1993). 
Board - U-24219 - 6 
We recognize that our Rules15 require a specific statement of any affirmative defense and the 
principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel are generally viewed as affirmative defenses in civil 
litigation under the Civil Practice Law and Rules.16 However, as noted in the case cited by the ALJ,17 
the CPLR defines as affirmative defenses "all matters which if not pleaded would be likely to take the 
adverse party by surprise" and PERB has only applied the principles of the CPLR to its proceedings 
where fairness dictates.18 Here, fairness dictates that we take administrative notice of our prior 
proceedings as both parties have requested that we do so, since no one objected to the County's 
opening statement, since the parties appear to have litigated the charge with the prior case holdings 
in mind and since to do so would assist the parties in understanding their rights and responsibilities in 
an area where they have spent much time on litigation.19 
In County of Nassau,20 we found that while the County vehicle use policy conditioned the 
assignment of vehicles upon the need for same in the performance of job duties, the charge then 
15Rules, §204.3(c)(2). 
16
 CPLR §3018(b). 
17
 In Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Auth, 29 PERB H4529, at 4574, aff'd, 29 PERB 1J3048 (1996), the 
ALJ permitted the affirmative defense to be to be raised in a motion to dismiss because was served 
on all parties, set forth with specificity the grounds upon which it was based and was sworn to as 
required of an answer. 
18
 See New York City Transit Auth, 20 PERB 1J3037 (1987). 
19
 The following represents the Nassau County cases that have come before PERB ostensibly on the 
issue of the past practice and whether the County violated the Act when it removed an assigned 
vehicle. See County of Nassau, 37 PERB 1J3014 (2004), confirmed sub nom. Superior Officers Assn v 
Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 2005 NY App. Div. LEXIS 13054, 38 PERB 1J7016 (2d Dept 2005); County 
of Nassau, 35 PERB 1J3036 (2002), County of Nassau, 35 PERB 1J4583 (2002), County of Nassau, 26 
PERBH3040 (1993), affd 2^\ 5 AD2d 381 (2d Dept 1995), 28 PERB1J7011 (1995), County of Nassau, 
19 PERB H4580 (1986) and County of Nassau, 13 PERB 1J3095 (1980), affg 13 PERB 1J4570 (1980), 
confirmed, 14 PERB 1J7017 (Sup Ct Nassau County 1981), affd 87 AD2d 1006, 15 PERB 1J7012 (2d 
Dept 1982), motion for leave to appeal denied, 57 NY2d 601, 15 PERB 1J7015 (1982). 
Supra, note 14. 
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before us involved the "withdrawal of the right to use the vehicles for transportation to and from work, 
not the conditions under which a vehicle will be assigned...." 
Here, it is the withdrawal of the assignment of the vehicles that is at issue, not merely the right 
to use the vehicles for commuting purposes if one happens to have an assigned vehicle. As a general 
principle, a public employer need not bargain about the manner in which it provides services to the 
public or about the equipment that its employees will utilize in performing their job functions.21 The 
County has preserved its right to make such determinations regarding County cars through its vehicle 
use policy and its process for re-evaluating employees' need of assigned vehicles.22 We have long 
held that when a benefit is granted under a stated condition or an express reservation of right, which 
remains unchanged by subsequent negotiations, the modification or cessation of the benefit in 
accordance with the stated condition or the retained right can not be considered an impermissible 
unilateral change23 (citation omitted). While CSEA attempted to demonstrate that the employees were 
not specifically told of any special conditions attached to their use of County vehicles, our prior 
decision and CSEA's tacit admissions here in the charge and the joint exhibits demonstrate their 
knowledge of the County's vehicle use policy. The Vehicle Use Affidavits, which were received as 
joint exhibits, demonstrate CSEA's knowledge and its admission that the County had the right to re-
evaluate vehicle assignments. To hold that the County was privileged to determine that the named 
21
 City Sch Dist of the City of New Rochelle, 4 PERB 1J3060 (1971 J, City of Albany, 7 PERB 1J3078 
(1974), Yorktown Faculty Assn, 7 PERB 1J3030 (1974), State of New York, 31 PERB 1J3053 (1998). 
22
 County of Nassau, 27 PERB 1J3049 (1994); State of New York (Div of Military and Naval Affairs), 24 
PERB H3024 (1991); Schuylerville Cent Sch Dist, 14 PERB 1J3035 (1981). 
23
 Gananda Cent Sch Dist, 17 PERB H 3095 (1984), affgM PERB 1J4589 (1984). See also County of 
Nassau, 27 PERB ^ 3049 (1994), discontinuing tuition reimbursement conditioned upon the County's 
financial ability upheld and conditional nature of the benefit did not have to be pled as an affirmative 
defense; New York City Transit Auth, 24 PERB 1J3013 (1991) grant of free parking on Authority 
property was a conditional benefit. 
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employees no longer required assigned vehicles, but to still require that they provide them to the 
employees for commuting purposes, would be nonsensical and in conflict with our prior decision. 
Once it is established that the County has the right to re-evaluate which employees require 
vehicles and to make or change vehicle assignments, our assessment is done. It is not for us to 
determine whether the County's individual assessments are correct. To do so would be to render the 
County's prerogative illusory. 
Based upon the foregoing, we hereby grant the County's exceptions, reverse, the decision of 
the ALJ and dismiss the charge. 
DATED: December 19, 2005 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/ John T. Mitchell, Member 
UA^JA^JJ^L^^-^^^T 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF PUTNAM AND PUTNAM COUNTY 
SHERIFF, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-25752 
PUTNAM COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT 
POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Respondent. 
ROEMER WALLENS & MINEAUX LLP (WILLIAM M. WALLENS of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
JOHN M. CROTTY, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Putnam County Sheriffs 
Department Police Benevolent Association, Inc. (PBA) and by the County of Putnam 
and Putnam County Sheriff (County) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
finding that the PBA violated §209-a.2 (b) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment 
Act (Act) when it submitted to compulsory interest arbitration certain proposals that were 
not arbitrable under §209.4(g) of the Act. 
Board- U-25752 -2 
EXCEPTIONS 
The PBA excepts to the ALJ's determination that the Board's decision in City of 
Cohoes,^ (hereafter, Cohoes), does not render certain of its demands arbitrable under 
§209.4(g) of the Act and also to the ALJ's determination that its proposals relating to 
overtime pay disputes, payments for accumulated sick leave and unused sick leave, 
retroactive wages and benefits, and to the 1997 stipulation of agreement are not 
arbitrable. 
The County excepts to the ALJ's determination that the PBA's proposal relating 
to health insurance for retirees and their dependents is mandatory and arbitrable under 
§209.4(g) of the Act. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm, in part, and reverse, in part, the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
In 2004,2 the Legislature amended the interest arbitration provisions of the Act to 
add §209.4(g), which provides in relevant part, as follows: 
With regard to members of any organized unit of deputy sheriffs . . . 
the provisions of this section shall only apply to the terms of collective 
bargaining agreements directly relating to compensation, including, but 
not limited to, salary, stipends, location pay, insurance, medical and 
hospitalization benefits; and shall not apply to non-compensatory 
issues including, but not limited to, job security, disciplinary procedures 
and actions, deployment or scheduling, or issues relating to eligibility 
for overtime compensation which shall be governed by other provisions 
proscribed by law. 
1
 31PERB 1J3020 (1998, confirmed sub nom. Uniform Firefighters of Cohoes v Cuevas, 
32 PERB H7026 (Sup Ct Albany County 1999), affd 276 AD2d 184, 33 PERB 1J7019 (3d 
Dep't 2000), leave to appeal denied 96 NY2d 711, 34 PERB 1J7018 (2001). 
2
 L 2004, ch 286. 
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Pursuant to §209.4(g), the PBA filed a petition for compulsory interest arbitration 
with PERB, setting forth the proposals it alleged were open and arbitrable. The County 
filed the instant improper practice charge alleging that the PBA violated §209-a.2 (b) of 
the Act by submitting demands to interest arbitration which were nonmandatory and/or 
non-arbitrable under the Act. 
The language of the in-issue demands are set forth in the DISCUSSION portion 
of this decision. 
DISCUSSION 
Access to the compulsory interest arbitration procedures of the Act were not 
extended by the Legislature to deputy sheriffs without limitation. Section 209.4(g) limits 
arbitration to only those terms which are directly related to compensation, including 
salary, stipends, location pay, insurance and medical and hospitalization benefits. 
Certain subjects are specifically excluded from arbitration, such as job security, 
disciplinary procedures and actions, deployment or scheduling and overtime 
compensation. 
The PBA argues that notwithstanding the limitation on those subjects that may be 
arbitrated as set forth in §209.4(g), our decision in Cohoes renders arbitrable all of its 
demands which target a provision of its collective bargaining agreement with the 
County. It asserts that the Legislature must have intended this result because Cohoes 
was decided before the enactment of §209.4(g) and the Legislature is presumed to 
have adopted the interpretation of statutory language in existence at the time of the 
legislation. The ALJ rejected this argument, finding that the inquiry under §209.4(g) of 
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the Act is not whether a proposal submitted to interest arbitration is mandatory in nature 
but, in addition to being mandatorily negotiable, whether or not it is directly related to 
compensation. 
The ALJ was correct in determining that Cohoes does not control the analysis of 
arbitrability under §204.9(g) of the Act. The conversion theory of negotiability in Cohoes 
was designed to render mandatory, as between the parties in a bargaining relationship, 
those terms of a collective bargaining agreement that are in issue in negotiations so that 
there can be finality in negotiations. A finding that a contract term is mandatorily 
negotiable does not necessarily resolve issues of arbitrability under §209.4(g). That 
analysis is totally different, requiring a determination as to whether a demand is directly 
related to compensation or is one of the subjects that the Legislature expressly 
excluded from arbitration. A demand may be a mandatory subject of negotiations and 
still not be arbitrable as to deputy sheriffs because of the express language of the 
statute. 
In New York State Police Investigators Association (hereafter, State Police),3 we 
interpreted the meaning of language virtually identical to the language of §209.4(g) of 
the Act. That case involved the language of the former §209.4(e), granting interest 
arbitration to investigators, senior investigators and investigator specialists of the state 
police force, which limited arbitration to those items directly relating to compensation 
and excluded demands related to noncompensatory matters including, but not limited 
to, job security, disciplinary procedures and actions, deployment or scheduling, or 
3
 30 PERB 1J3013 (1997), confirmed sub nom. New York State Police Investigators 
Association v. PERB, 30 PERB 1J7011 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1997). 
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issues relating to eligibility for overtime compensation that were governed by other 
provisions prescribed by law.4 In defining what was meant by "directly relating to 
compensation", we stated5: 
All noncompensatory demands are excluded from compulsory 
arbitration under §209.4(e) because they necessarily have no 
relationship to compensation. This does not mean, however, ... that 
all compensatory issues are arbitrable unless their relationship to 
compensation is as attenuated as the subjects which are 
specifically listed as examples of noncompensatory issues. That 
argument drains all significance from the word "directly." The 
subjects excluded from arbitration under §209.4(e) do not define 
the subjects which are included because a subject must satisfy two 
conditions simultaneously to be arbitrable under §209.4(e). It must 
fall within the included compensatory category and fall without the 
excluded category of noncompensatory subjects. Even if a subject 
is not excluded from arbitration as noncompensatory, it is not 
necessarily arbitrable. A subject does not fit within the included 
category, even if it is compensatory in nature, unless it also 
"directly" relates to compensation. The degree of a demand's 
relationship to compensation is measured by the characteristic of 
the demand. If the sole, predominant or primary characteristic of 
the demand is compensation, then it is arbitrable because the 
demand to that extent directly relates to compensation. A demand 
has compensation as its sole, predominant or primary characteristic 
only when it seeks to effect some change in amount or level of 
compensation by either payment from the State to or on behalf of 
an employee or the modification of an employee's financial 
obligation arising from the employment relationship (e.g., a change 
in an insurance co-payment). If the effect is otherwise, then the 
relationship of the demand to compensation becomes secondary 
and indirect and the subject is, therefore, excluded from the scope 
of compulsory arbitration under the language of § 209.4(e). 
Our analysis in State Police is dispositive of the issues before us here. As a 
result, we find, as did the ALJ, that certain of the PBA's demands are not arbitrable and 
4
 Section 209.4(e) was amended by Chapter 587 of the Laws of 2001 to repeal this 
restrictive language relating to binding arbitration. 
5
 30 PERB at 3028. 
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must be withdrawn from interest arbitration.6 Those demands are: Number 2, 
Recognition and Association Rights, Paragraph G; Number 5, Personal Leave; Number 
6, Hours of Work, Overtime and Recall - paragraphs C(2) and C(3); Number 10, 
Vacations; Number 11, Grievance Procedure; Number 12, Sick Leave as to 
subparagraph A2, C and D; Number 13, Disciplinary Procedure; Number 15, 
Negotiations to delete subparagraph B; Number 16, Maintenance of Operations, 
Paragraphs A, B and C; Number 17, Separability; Number 19, Fully Bargained 
Agreement; and Number 20, Duration.7 
As to the remaining demands, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
The PBA excepts to the ALJ's determination that its proposals relating to 
overtime pay disputes, payments for accumulated sick leave and unused sick leave, 
retroactive wages and benefits and to the 1997 stipulation of agreement are not 
arbitrable. 
PBA demand Number 6, Article 8 - Hours of Work, Overtime and Recall 
D. Overtime Compensation 
2. Overtime Compensation Dispute 
In the event the overtime claimed by an employee is being 
denied in whole or in part, such employee will be so notified. 
Thereafter, if the employee wishes to object to such denial, 
he/she may do so in the following manner: 
6
 The ALJ interpreted the PBA's concession that, if State Police controlled, certain of its 
demands were not arbitrable under that decision, as providing a basis upon which to 
conclude that these demands had been withdrawn from arbitration. The PBA, however, 
argues in its exceptions that the demands have not been withdrawn. 
PBA's Petition for Compulsory Interest Arbitration. 
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a. The employee will reduce the complaint to writing and 
refer the matter to the President and Vice President of 
the Association. 
b. The staff officer, President and Vice President and 
member of the Association involved will then confer with 
reference to the dispute and attempt to work out an 
agreement. 
c. If an agreement is not reached, then a hearing will be 
held with the Sheriff, staff officer involved, President and 
Vice President and member of the Association involved 
in the dispute. 
d. In the event the Sheriff, President and Vice President of 
the Association fail to reach an agreement as to the 
overtime for which an employee is to be compensated, 
then the dispute shall be submitted to the County as a 
grievance in accordance with the terms of this Contract. 
The ALJ found that the PBA's demand to delete the above provision from the 
collective bargaining agreement was not arbitrable because it dealt with overtime 
eligibility, which is specifically excluded from arbitration by the language of §209.4(g) of 
the Act. The PBA argues that the ALJ erred because the proposal does not deal with 
eligibility but with a procedure to resolve overtime pay disputes. We agree that the 
provision does not deal with eligibility for overtime, but neither does it deal directly with 
compensation. As only those items that deal directly with compensation are arbitrable, 
the PBA's demand relating to a procedure for resolving overtime disputes, which is not 
directly related to compensation, is not arbitrable. 
PBA proposal 12; Article 15 - Sick Leave 
J. Amend the schedule to read as follows: 
Days: 1 - 70 days - all days accumulated at 20% of daily rate 
71 - 110 days - all days accumulated at 40% of daily rate 
111 - 150 days - all days accumulated at 60% of daily rate 
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151 -180 days - all days accumulated at 80% of daily rate 
181 days and Above - all days accumulated at 100% of daily rate 
NEW I: The County shall pay, in first (1st) pay period of January of 
each year, the following sick leave incentive bonus: 
Sick Leave Days Used Amount 
0 - 1 4 days Base Wage 
2 2 days Base Wage 
3 1 day Base Wage 
The ALJ found both demands to be improperly submitted to arbitration as not 
dealing directly with compensation, relying on State Police. There, we determined that 
proposals providing for sick leave accumulation were not arbitrable because, while such 
proposals "could eventually confer an economic benefit upon the employee", they 
represented potential compensation and were not directly related to compensation. The 
PBA argues that the demands here in issue call for the payment of cash either upon 
separation from employment or at the first of each year in which sick leave has not been 
used or used sparingly. But, as Supreme Court found with the sick leave accrual 
demand in State Police, the mere fact that the demands could result in the payment of 
cash and as such seek to increase the rate of compensation is not a sufficient basis 
upon which to find that the demands are directly related to compensation.8 They are, 
therefore, not properly submitted to arbitration. 
PBA demand Number 18; Article 2 1 - Legislative Action and Retroactivity 
B. Amend to read as follows: 
All wages, economic and other benefits shall apply and be paid 
to any employee who worked during the expired term of this 
Agreement. 
30 PERB H7011, at 7019-20 (Sup Ct Albany County 1997). 
Board- U-25752 -9 
The ALJ found that this demand, which covers both unit employees who are 
working at the time the arbitration award becomes effective as well as those employees 
who leave the County's employ before that time, is not arbitrable as it seeks payment to 
former employees for whom the County has no obligation to negotiate. We disagree. In 
Bridge and Tunnel Officers Benevolent Association,9 in deciding the retroactivity of a 
demand, we held that: 
"Current" employees, for purposes of assessing the negotiability 
of a demand in negotiations, and unless otherwise defined by 
the parties, must mean all employees who were employed 
during the term of the contract being negotiated, even if the 
negotiations continue, as they so often do, beyond the term of 
the prior contract and the demand in issue is not first presented 
until well into the negotiations. Just as a demand may be 
retroactive, so too may its application to the class of employees 
covered by the demand. 
This demand deals solely with the retroactivity of wages and other economic benefits 
and is thus directly related to compensation. That it applies to employees who are still 
employed when the arbitration award is issued, as well as those who left the County's 
service during the contract hiatus, does not render it non-arbitrable. 
PBA demand Number 22: Appendix D - Stipulation of Agreement Dated 
April 29, 1997. 
Replace the reference to CFR to CFR - Defibrillator 
The ALJ determined that this demand is not arbitrable as it has no relation to 
compensation. The PBA argues that the April 29, 1997 Stipulation of Agreement 
contains provisions for the payment of tuition, equipment, supplies and stipends. This 
demand seeks to clarify who is eligible to receive the monies and benefits set forth in 
9
 29 PERB H3012, at 3033 (1996). 
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the Stipulation and, as such, the PBA argues that it is directly related to compensation. 
As the demand seeks merely to effectuate a technical change in the definition of those 
employees covered by the Stipulation, it is not directly related to compensation and is 
not properly submitted to arbitration under §209.4(g) of the Act. 
The County excepts to the ALJ's determination with respect to retiree health 
insurance. 
Article 5 - Insurance - New: G 
Effective January 1, 2003, upon retirement the County shall pay 
one hundred percent (100%) of the health insurance premium or 
cost for the retiree and eligible dependents. The health 
insurance plan shall be the same as provided to active 
employees. 
Health insurance benefits for current employees after they retire are mandatory 
subjects of negotiations.10 Section 209.4(g) of the Act specifically makes insurance and 
medical and hospitalization benefits arbitrable. The County argues that benefits for 
retirees that extend beyond the term of the collective bargaining agreement and/or 
arbitration award under which they retire and benefits for beneficiaries of employees are 
nonmandatory subjects of negotiations and not arbitrable within the meaning of 
§209.4(g) of the Act. In Town of Shawangunk,u we held that "health insurance benefits 
extended to an individual upon that individual's retirement from employment are a form 
10
 See City of Cohoes, supra; Bridge and Tunnel Officers Benevolent Assn, 29 PERB 
1J3012 (1996); Cohoes Police Benevolent and Protective Assn, 27 PERB 1J3058 (1994). 
11
 32 PERB 1J3042, at 3095 (1999). See also Lynbrook Police Benevolent Assn, 10 
PERB 1J3067 (1977), revd in part sub nom. Incorporated Village of Lynbrook v PERB, 
64 AD2d 902, 11 PERB 1J7012 (2d Dept 1978), reinstated, 48 NY2d 398, 12 PERB 
1J7021 (1979). 
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of deferred compensation representing a payment in the future for services a former 
employee has rendered in the past." As both compensation and insurance, health 
insurance benefits for retirees are arbitrable under §209.4(g). To the extent that the 
County is urging this Board to reconsider its prior decisions holding health insurance 
coverage for current employees upon their retirement and for the dependents of such 
employees to be mandatory, the County articulates no new or compelling reasons for 
such reconsideration, even were it possible to do so in light of court decisions holding 
that such subjects are mandatorily negotiable.12 
Based on the foregoing, we deny the County's exceptions, and grant the PBA's 
exceptions as to clarifying that certain of its demands have not already been withdrawn 
and as to PBA Demand 18. We reverse the ALJ's decision as to PBA Demand 18 and 
affirm, as modified, the ALJ's decision as to the remaining PBA demands. 
We find that the PBA violated §209.2(b) of the Act when it submitted to 
arbitration, pursuant to §209.4(g) of the Act, the following demands: 
Number 2, Recognition and Association Rights, Paragraph G; 
Number 5, Personal Leave; 
Number 6, Hours of Work, Overtime and Recall - paragraphs 
C(2) and C(3); 
Number 6, D. 2 (overtime disputes) 
Number 10, Vacations; 
Number 11, Grievance Procedure; 
Number 12, Sick Leave as to subparagraph A2, C and D; 
Number 12, 15(J) and new addition to Article 15; 
Number 13, Disciplinary Procedure; 
Number 15, Negotiations to delete subparagraph B; 
Number 16, Maintenance of Operations, Paragraphs A, B and C; 
Number 17, Separability; 
12
 See Aeneas McDonald Police Benevolent Assn, Inc v City of Geneva, 92 NY 2d 326, 
31 PERB 1J7503 (1998). See also Lynbrook, note 9. 
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Number 19, Fully Bargained Agreement; and 
Number 20, Duration. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the PBA withdraw these demands from 
arbitration. In all other respects, the charge is dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: December 19, 2005 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing its charge which alleged that the County of 
Westchester (County) violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment 
Act (Act) when it unilaterally transferred messenger services exclusively performed by 
CSEA unit employees in the County's Department of Social Services (DSS) to an 
independent contractor. 
The ALJ found that the County's use of independent contractors to perform 
messenger services for ten years, alongside unit employees, showed that the work was 
not exclusive bargaining unit work and dismissed the charge. 
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EXCEPTIONS 
CSEA excepts to the ALJ's decision arguing that the ALJ erred in failing to find 
that a discernible boundary could be drawn around the messenger services performed 
by unit employees and those that had been performed by outside contractors in the 
past. The County supports the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
The parties entered into a stipulation of facts upon which the ALJ's decision is 
based.1 The parties stipulated to the following facts: 
1. The County is a public employer as defined in the Taylor Law. 
2. CSEA is a public employee organization as defined by the Taylor Law. 
3. The County and CSEA are parties to a collective bargaining agreement that 
expires on December 31, 2005. The agreement is silent as to the subject 
matter of the instant charge. 
4. For more than 10 years, DSS mailroom employees, who are CSEA 
[bargaining unit] members, have performed messenger services as part of 
their duties. 
5. For more than 10 years, DSS has utilized the services of an outside 
contractor to supplement the messenger services performed by unit 
members on specific occasions. 
6. Those occasions were when the County vehicles were "grounded" due to 
1
 38 PERB H4573 (2005). 
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inclement weather and where all bargaining unit mailroom employees that 
were on duty on any given day were already engaged in messenger services 
for DSS or the mailroom was otherwise short staffed. In other words, DSS 
utilized a contractor for messenger services on occasions where bargaining 
unit mailroom employees were unable to perform such services. 
7. On or about January 7, 2005, the County entered into a contract with 
Service Warehousing and Logistics, Inc. (Logistics). The County did not 
negotiate with CSEA prior to entering into the contract. 
8. Under that contract, Logistics provides DSS with services for all of DSS' 
messenger needs. Since the execution of that contract, DSS' mailroom 
employees no longer provide messenger services for DSS. 
9. Since January 7, 2005, no mailroom employees have lost their jobs as a 
result of the County's contract with Logistics. However, as a result of the 
contract with Logistics, the County transferred four mailroom employees who 
previously performed messenger services out of the White Plains DDS 
office. 
DISCUSSION 
A transfer of unit work is mandatorily negotiable if the work has been performed 
by unit employees exclusively and the tasks as reassigned are substantially similar to 
those previously performed by unit employees.2 Here, the ALJ found that the 
messenger services performed by unit employees in the DSS mailroom had, for the 
preceding ten years, also been performed by an outside contractor. The outside 
2
 Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority, 18 PERB 1J3083 (1985). 
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contractor was used in situations when unit employees were not otherwise available to 
perform messenger services, when there was inclement weather and when County 
vehicles were "grounded". 
We have found that a regular and open assignment of nonunit personnel to work 
done by unit employees for a period in excess of one year constitutes a breach of 
exclusivity which precludes the union from establishing exclusivity in fact over the work 
allegedly transferred.3 It is only when the use of nonunit personnel to perform unit work 
is limited and incidental and occurs on a significantly small number of occasions when 
compared to the work performed regularly by unit employees, that such incursions into 
the performance of unit work is insufficient to defeat the unit's claim of exclusivity.4 
Here, the stipulated record omits any reference to the job duties involved in the 
provision of messenger services and establishes that, for ten years, in three different 
sets of circumstances, the County regularly utilized a private contractor to perform 
messenger services for DSS. CSEA has the burden to demonstrate that it performed 
the work exclusively. Given the undisputed facts, CSEA has not shown that the use of 
nonunit employees by the County was so limited or insignificant as not to have 
breached CSEA's claim of exclusivity. 
CSEA argues that the ALJ erred by failing to find that there was a discernible 
boundary that could be drawn around the work retained by CSEA unit employees that 
would preserve exclusivity as to that portion of the messenger services. An analysis of 
"discernible boundary" is necessary when there are sufficient inroads into what is 
3
 State of New York (Division of Military and Naval Affairs), 27 PERB 1J3027 (1994). 
4
 County of Onondaga, 27 PERB 1J3048 (1994). 
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asserted to be the exclusive work of the bargaining unit5 and where the unit work 
involves multiple tasks, multiple-function jobs or multiple locations.6 The record here 
shows that when CSEA unit employees in the DSS mailroom were unavailable due to 
inclement weather, were already engaged in messenger services or the mailroom was 
short-staffed, nonunit personnel were utilized to perform the same messenger services 
that were regularly performed by unit employees. Those services are not described in 
enough detail in the record to enable us to determine that the messenger services are 
of the type that requires a discernible boundary analysis or to find that CSEA has 
retained exclusivity over any definable part of the messenger services.7 
Based on the foregoing, we deny CSEA's exceptions and affirm the ALJ's 
decision. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be and hereby is 
dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: December 19, 2005 
Albany, New York 
^U 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/ John T. Mitchell, Member 
5
 See County of Westchester, 33 PERB 1J3057 (2000). 
6
 City of Rome, 32 PERB 1J3058 (1999). 
7
 To the extent that CSEA relies upon City of Syracuse, 31 PERB 1J4646 (1998), the 
Board is not bound by a decision of an ALJ. 
lAC^Uu^i<;-^^^s^r 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the County of Ulster and Ulster 
County Sheriff (County) and by the Ulster County Deputy Sheriffs Police Benevolent 
Association, Inc. (PBA) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge1 (ALJ) on a 
charge filed by the County alleging that the PBA violated §209-a.2(b) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it submitted to compulsory interest 
arbitration certain proposals that were not arbitrable under §209.4(g) of the Act. 
1
 38 PERB H4563 (2005). 
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EXCEPTIONS 
The County excepts to the ALJ's finding that certain of the PBA's proposals are 
arbitrable. The PBA excepts to the ALJ's decision on the law and his determination that 
its proposals for membership dues and agency shop dues deduction are not arbitrable. 
The PBA filed a response to the County's exceptions. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
The ALJ decided the case upon a stipulated record that included the improper 
practice charge, verified answer and the notice of conference. The improper practice 
charge alleged in substance that the County and the PBA previously negotiated a 
collective bargaining agreement for the term of January 1, 1999 through December 31, 
2002.2 Subsequently, negotiations for a successor agreement reached impasse and, 
after mediation proved unsuccessful, the PBA filed a petition for compulsory interest 
arbitration, dated April 12, 2005.3 
Pursuant to §209.4(g) of the Act, the provisions for compulsory interest 
arbitration for County deputy sheriffs: 
shall only apply to the terms of collective bargaining agreements 
directly relating to compensation, including, but not limited to, salary, 
stipends, location pay, insurance, medical and hospitalization 
benefits . . . . 
The County alleged that the PBA's proposals for membership dues deduction, 
agency shop fee, retiree health insurance, sick leave and retirement were non-
2
 Improper Practice Charge - Exhibit A. 
3
 Improper Practice Charge - Exhibit B. 
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arbitrable. The language of each proposal is set forth below in the DISCUSSION 
portion of this decision. 
DISCUSSION 
The Act was amended in 2004 to provide interest arbitration for bargaining 
units of deputy sheriff who are engaged in criminal law enforcement that comprises 
more than 50% of their duties. The amendment, §209.4(g), limits binding arbitration to 
the terms of the collective bargaining agreements directly relating to compensation, 
including, but not limited to, salary, stipends, location pay, insurance, medical and 
hospitalization benefits. 
The PBA contends that the language of §209.4(g) is exactly the same as former 
§209.4(e), which applied to interest arbitration for members of the New York State 
Police. In 1997, PERB decided an improper practice charge filed by the State of New 
York (Governor's Office of Employee Relations) alleging that the New York State Police 
Investigators Association included demands which were not arbitrable in a petition for 
compulsory interest arbitration pursuant to §209.4(e) of the Act.4 At that time, 
§209.4(e) specifically provided for interest arbitration of terms: 
directly relating to compensation, including, but not limited to, salary, 
stipends, location pay insurance, medical and hospitalization benefits; 
and shall not apply to non-compensatory issues including but not 
limited to, job security, disciplinary procedures and actions, 
deployment or scheduling, or issues relating to eligibility for overtime 
compensation which shall be governed by other provisions prescribed 
by law. 
4
 See New York State Police Investigators Assn, 30 PERB 1J3013, confirmed sub nom 
New York State Police Investigators Assn v PERB, 30 PERB 1J7011 (Sup Ct Albany 
County 1997). 
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Section 209.4(e) was amended in 20025 to specifically prohibit from interest 
arbitration for members of State police bargaining units only issues relating to 
disciplinary procedures and investigations or eligibility and 
assignment to details and positions which shall be governed by other 
provisions prescribed by law. 
The scope of interest arbitration for State police units is now contained in §209.4(d). 
This includes: 
the terms of collective agreements negotiated between the parties in 
the past providing for compensation and fringe benefits, including but 
not limited to, the provisions for salary, insurance and retirement 
benefits, medical and hospitalization benefits, paid time off and job 
security. 
The Board determined in State Police Investigators Association (hereafter, State 
Police),6 that "the phrase 'directly relating to compensation' does not and cannot 
mean... only 'direct compensation' to unit employees from the State". The Board looked 
at the use of the word compensation in other parts of §209 and determined that the 
Legislature intended the word compensation to include a wide variety of subjects. The 
Board then tested the relationship between a particular bargaining demand and 
compensation:7 
If the sole, predominate, or primary characteristic of the demand is 
compensation, then it is arbitrable because the demand to that extent 
directly relates to compensation. A demand has compensation as its 
sole, predominate or primary characteristic only when it seeks to effect 
some change in the amount or level of compensation by either payment 
from the State to or on behalf an employee or the modification of an 
employee's financial obligation arising from the employment relationship 
(e.g. a change in an insurance co-payment). If the effect is otherwise, 
then the relationship of the demand to compensation becomes 
5
 L 2002, ch 232. 
6
 Supra, note 4, at 3027. 
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secondary and indirect and the subject is, therefore, excluded from the 
scope of compulsory arbitration under the language of §209.4(e). 
This test was adopted by Supreme Court, Albany County, in its decision 
confirming the Board's decision.8 
The PBA proposed to make certain additions and amendments to the parties' 
collective bargaining agreement. The following proposals are in dispute: 
1. ARTICLE 2 - RECOGNITION, MEMBERSHIP DUES DEDUCTION, 
AGENCY SHOP FEE AND OTHER REDUCTIONS: (pp. 1-2) 
Section 2 - Membership Dues Deduction: 
Add the following to the first (1st) paragraph: 
The Employer shall provide, each payroll period to the Union Treasurer, 
the names and addresses of each employee represented by the Union 
and dues deductions made to date. The Employer shall deduct from part 
time employees, any and all arrearages of dues owed from the payroll 
periods not worked. The Employer shall forward all dues deductions to 
the Union on the same day as the payroll is made. 
Section 3 - Agency Shop Fee: 
Add the following to the second (2nd) paragraph: 
The Employer shall provide, each payroll period to the Union Treasurer, 
the names and addresses of each employee represented by the Union 
and Agency Shop Fee deductions made to date. The Employer shall 
deduct from part time employees, any and all arrearages of Agency Shop 
Fee deductions owed from the payroll periods not worked. The Employer 
shall forward all Agency Shop Fee deductions to the Union on the same 
day as the payroll is made. 
The ALJ found that while the PBA's proposals for membership dues deduction 
and agency shop are mandatory subjects of negotiations, they were not arbitrable. We 
agree. PBA's proposal number 1, sections 2 and 3, Membership Dues Deduction and 
Agency Shop Fee, do not meet the test for compensation. There is no nexus between 
the dues deduction and the unit members' relationship to the County. The relationship 
State Police Investigators Assn., 30 PERB at 7018-19. 
Board - U-25870 -6 
exists between the unit member and the PBA. The proposal is secondary to the 
employment relationship and must, therefore, be excluded from the scope of 
compulsory arbitration.9 
2. ARTICLE 5 - EMPLOYEE BENEFITS: (pp. 5-15) 
Section 1 - Health Insurance: 
Paragraph 2 - Amend to read as follows: 
The Employer agrees to pay 100% of the premium or cost for all full time 
employees and dependents health insurance coverage who have 
completed five (5) years or more of service. 
Upon retirement, the Employer shall pay 100% of the premium or cost for 
full time employees and dependents health insurance coverage in effect at 
that time. 
The County argues that PBA's Proposal #2, Section 1 demanding that the 
County provide fully paid medical insurance to unit members and their dependents upon 
retirement is not subject to interest arbitration because it is not directly related to 
compensation within the meaning of §209.4(g) of the Act. Furthermore, the County 
argues that the duration of the benefit extends beyond the term of the collective 
bargaining agreement and/or the interest arbitration award.10 The County urges us to 
decline to follow our "conversion theory"11 of negotiability with regard to this proposal 
9
 See also City of Troy 28 PERB 1J3027 (1995). 
10See Village of Saugerties Police Benevolent Assn, 38 PERB 1J3034 (December 19, 
2005). 
11
 See City of Cohoes, 31 PERB 1J3020 (1998), confirmed sub nom, Uniform Firefighters 
of Cohoes v Cuevas, 32 PERB 1J7026 (Sup Ct Albany County 1999), affd 276 AD2d 
184, 33 PERB 1J7019 (3d Dept 2000), Iv to appeal denied, 96 NY2d 711, 34 PERB 
117018(2001). 
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because it will result in an undue burden. As we decided today in Putnam County 
Sheriff's Department Police Benevolent Association, Inc.:'12 
Health insurance benefits for current employees after they retire 
are mandatory subjects of negotiations.[footnote omitted] Section 
209.4(g) of the Act specifically makes insurance and medical and 
hospitalization benefits arbitrable. The County argues that benefits for 
retirees that extend beyond the term of the collective bargaining 
agreement and/or arbitration award under which they retire and 
benefits for beneficiaries of employees are nonmandatory subjects of 
negotiations and not arbitrable within the meaning of §209.4(g) of the 
Act. In Town of Shawangunk, [32 PERB 1J3042, at 3095 (1999)] we 
held that "health insurance benefits extended to an individual upon 
that individual's retirement from employment are a form of deferred 
compensation representing a payment in the future for services a 
former employee has rendered in the past." As both compensation 
and insurance, health insurance benefits for retirees are arbitrable 
under §209.4(g). To the extent that the County is urging this Board to 
reconsider its prior decisions holding health insurance coverage for 
current employees upon their retirement and for the dependents of 
such employees to be mandatory, the County articulates no new or 
compelling reasons for such reconsideration, even were it possible to 
do so in light of court decisions holding that such subjects are 
mandatorily negotiable.[See Aeneas McDonald Police Benevolent 
Ass'., Inc. v City of Geneva, 92 NY 2d 326, 31 PERB 1J7503 (1998). 
See also Lynbrook, Police Benevolent Assn., 10 PERB 1J3067 (1977), 
rev'd in part sub nom. Incorporated Vil. of Lynbrook v PERB, 64 AD2d 
902, 11 PERB H7012 (2d Dep't 1978), revd., 48 NY2d 398, 12 PERB 
H7021 (1979).] 
Section 17 - Retirement: 
Add the following: 
3. The Employer shall adopt and implement the Special Retirement Plan for 
Sheriffs, Undersheriffs and Deputy Sheriffs (Article 14-B: Section 552, 
20 Year Service Retirement and 553, the additional 1/60th benefit) for all 
service. 
The County contends that the PBA's Proposal #2, Section 17 requiring the 
County to adopt and implement the 20-year retirement plan and the additional 1/60th 
12
 38 PERB H3031 (December 19, 2005). 
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benefit is not subject to interest arbitration because it includes the nonunit titles of 
Sheriff and Undersheriff. The County also argues that the benefit does not directly 
relate to compensation and that, pursuant to Retirement and Social Security Law, §384-
e(c), the 1/60th benefit for each year of service may not be negotiated under §209.4 of 
the Act. 
The PBA correctly argues in its brief to the ALJ that the negotiability and 
arbitrability of retirement benefits available by law has been firmly established.13 The 
Court of Appeals in Association of Surrogates and Supreme Court Reporters Within the 
City of New York v State of New Yorku (hereafter, Surrogates) interpreted compensation 
within the meaning of the Act to include such subjects as insurance, pensions, 
vacations, military leave, and even uniform allowances. The Court in Surrogates relied 
upon Matter of Teachers Association, Central High School District No. 3 v Board of 
Education, Central High School District No.3, Nassau County^5 (hereafter, Teachers 
Association) for its opinion that pensions are a form of compensation. In Teachers 
Association, the Appellate Division determined that16: 
[T]he courts have recognized that the State and its municipalities in 
granting pensions, vacations or military leave are not conferring gifts 
upon their employees, but that essentially the promised rewards are 
conditions of employment - a form of compensation withheld or 
deferred until the completion of continued and faithful service 
(citations omitted). 
13
 See Fairport Police Billy Club, 14 PERB 1J3079 (1981), confirmed sub nom. Matter of 
Vil. of Fairport v Newman, 90 AD2d 293, 15 PERB 1J7033 (4th Dept 1982), appeal 
dismissed 58 NY2d 1112, 16 PERB ^7013 (1983). 
14
 78 NY2d 143, 24 PERB 1J7526 (1991). 
15
 34 AD2d 351 (2d Dep't 1970). 
16
 Id., at 353. 
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The County's argument that the proposal includes the Sheriff and Undersheriff 
and is, therefore, not arbitrable lacks merit. The PBA's proposal is not ambiguous 
simply because the Sheriffs and Undersheriffs titles are mentioned in the proposal. 
Article 14-B of the Retirement and Social Security statute is entitled "Special Retirement 
Plans for Sheriffs, Undersheriffs and Deputy Sheriffs Engaged in Law Enforcement 
Activities". The PBA's proposals at §17 simply identifiy the origin of the plan. The 
County's objection is, therefore, to the form of the proposal rather than its substance. 
As to the arbitrability of the 1/60th benefit, the County contends that Retirement 
and Social Security Law, §384-e(c) excludes the benefit from interest arbitration for 
police units and should apply in the instant case. However, this proscription was not 
included in §553 of the Retirement and Social Security Law, entitled "Additional Pension 
Benefit for Members of Optional Twenty Year Retirement Plan", and the PBA argues 
that its omission in §553 evidences the Legislature's intent to permit negotiation over 
the benefit. It is axiomatic that, under the Taylor Law, the public policy of New York in 
favor of collective bargaining is strong and sweeping.17 The presumption in favor of 
bargaining may be overcome only in special circumstances where the legislative intent 
to remove the issue from mandatory bargaining is plain and clear, or where a specific 
statutory directive leaves no room for negotiation.18 Thus, only where a statute clearly 
forecloses negotiation of a particular subject may that subject be deemed a prohibited 
subject of bargaining.19 Since §553 does not foreclose negotiation over the subject 
matter, the demand is both mandatory and arbitrable. 
17
 Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New York v New York 
State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd, 75 NY2d 660 (1990). 
18
 Id, at 667. 
19
 City of Watertown, 95 NY2d 73 (2000). 
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Section 6 - Sick Leave: 
Amend to read as follows: 
All full-time employees shall be credited with eight (8) hours (1 work day) of 
sick leave on the first (1st) day of each calendar month, without limitation to 
accumulation. 
The PBA argues that this proposal providing for unlimited sick leave 
accumulation is directly related to compensation. The ALJ found the subject excluded 
from interest arbitration under the test used to determine compensation in State Police. 
We agree with the ALJ. 
One of the demands at issue before us in State Police also proposed sick leave 
accumulation. The demand, as here, concerned time off from work without loss of pay. 
We found the effect of such a demand on compensation was clear but nevertheless 
indirect. The PBA's proposal simply maintains a member's salary or wage at the 
negotiated rate during an employee's absence from work. There is no change in 
compensation. Consequently, the predominant or, at least, primary characteristic of this 
proposal affects hours of work and not compensation. Thus, we find that the PBA's sick 
leave proposal is non-arbitrable. 
In reaching our conclusions regarding the aforementioned proposals, we are not 
deciding the merits of the proposals, only their negotiability. Our decision in any scope 
of negotiations case should be construed only as a determination of whether, as in this 
case, a proposal may properly be submitted to interest arbitration under §209.4(g) of the 
Act. 
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Based on the foregoing, the County's exceptions are denied and the PBA's 
specific exception as to membership dues deduction and agency shop fee is denied. 
The decision of the ALJ is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the PBA withdraw from compulsory interest 
arbitration the proposals numbered: 
1. Article 2, Section 2 - Membership Dues Deduction 
Section 3 - Agency Shop Fee 
2. Article 5, Section 6 - Sick Leave. 
In all other respects, the charge is dismissed. 
DATED: December 19, 2005 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Village of Saugerties (Village) 
to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on a charge filed by the Village 
alleging that the Village of Saugerties Police Benevolent Association (PBA) violated 
§209-a.2(b) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by submitting certain 
nonmandatory bargaining proposals for consideration at compulsory interest arbitration 
under §209 of the Act. 
EXCEPTIONS 
The Village excepts to the ALJ's finding that the PBA's proposal to convert 
accumulated leave into health insurance premiums for retirees or their dependents is 
mandatorily negotiable. The Village further excepts to the ALJ's failure to address the 
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issue of whether providing health insurance beyond the term of the parties' collective 
bargaining agreement under which an employee retires and also providing health 
insurance for the employees' beneficiaries is a mandatory subject of bargaining. 
The PBA submitted a response in support of the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ's decision. 
FACTS 
The case was decided by the ALJ on a stipulated record submitted by the 
parties.1 
The language of each demand is set forth below in the discussion of the 
mandatory or nonmandatory nature of the demands. 
DISCUSSION 
The PBA proposed to make the following additions and amendments to the 
parties' collective bargaining agreement. 
5. ARTICLE 13-HOLIDAYS: (pp. 10-11) 
(NEW) 13.4 Add a new section to read as follows: 
An employee shall be entitled to accumulate and carry over from year 
to year, any unused Holiday compensatory days, including floating 
Holidays. Any Holiday compensatory days off elected not to be used 
shall be placed in that employee's health insurance on retirement 
account for additional coverage as set forth in Article 23, Pension, 
Group Health and Life Insurance, Section 23.4. However, in the event 
an employee uses all of his/her accumulated sick leave, he/she shall 
be entitled to use all or part of his/her accumulated Holiday 
compensatory days in the health insurance on retirement account to 
insure a paycheck for that period of time for which the Holiday 
compensatory days cover. However, in the event of a disability 
retirement as set forth in Article 23, Pension, Group Health and Life 
1
 38 PERB H4565 (2005). 
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Insurance, Section 23.4, all unused Holiday compensatory days in the 
employee's health insurance on retirement account shall be forfeited 
and returned to the Employer. 
6. ARTICLE 14-SICK LEAVE: (pp. 11-12) 
14.2 Amend to read as follows: 
All employees shall be entitled to unlimited accumulation of sick leave. 
All unused accumulated sick leave shall be carried over from year to 
year. Upon retirement, the employee shall be entitled to apply all or 
any part of his/her unused accumulated sick leave for additional health 
insurance on retirement as set forth in Article 23, Pension, Group 
Health and Life Insurance, Section 23.4. However, in the event of a 
disability retirement as set forth in Article 23, Pension, Group Health 
and Life Insurance, Section 23.4, all unused sick leave in the 
employee's health insurance on retirement account shall be forfeited 
and returned to the Employer. 
14.3 Delete in its entirety. 
10. ARTICLE 18-WORK DAY AND WORKWEEK: (pp. 14-15) 
(NEW) 18.9 Add a new section to read as follows: 
An employee shall be entitled to accumulate and carry over from year 
to year, any unused compensatory time. Any compensatory time 
elected not to be used shall be placed in that employee's health 
insurance on retirement account for additional coverage as set forth in 
Article 23, Pension, Group Health and Life Insurance, Section 23.4. 
However, in the event an employee uses all of his/her accumulated 
sick leave, he/she shall be entitled to use all or part of his/her 
accumulated compensatory time in the health insurance on retirement 
account to insure a paycheck for that period of time for which the 
vacation time covers. However, in the event of a disability retirement 
as set forth in Article 23, Pension, Group Health and Life Insurance, 
Section 23.4, all unused compensatory time in the employee's health 
insurance on retirement account shall be forfeited and returned to the 
Employer. 
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12. ARTICLE 23 - PENSION, GROUP HEALTH AND LIFE INSURANCE PLANS: 
(pp. 18-19) 
23.4 Amend to read as follows: 
An employee who retires shall be provided with the same level of 
benefits contained in the Core Plus Medical and Psychiatric 
Enhancements Plan as described in the New York State Insurance 
Plan (known as the Empire Plan) provided to active employees, or if 
elected, the HMO MVP 10+. The Employer shall contribute towards 
the premium cost of 50% for individual and an additional 35% of the 
difference for dependent coverage without returning any paid leave 
accumulation set forth below. The Employer shall provide additional 
contribution towards the premium cost of health insurance based on 
the following schedule for the return of paid leave: 
Unused Sick Leave, Compensatory 
Time, Chart Days, Vacation, Holidays Percent of Health Insurance 
and/or Personal Leave Days Premium Paid by the Employer 
Individual Dependent 
105-114 65% 65% 
115-124 70% 70% 
125-134 75% 75% 
135-144 80% 80% 
145-154 85% 85% 
155-164 90% 90% 
165-174 95% 95% 
175 100% 100% 
An employee who receives a disability retirement from the New York 
State Police and Fire Retirement System shall receive individual and/or 
dependent health insurance with the Employer paying one hundred 
percent (100%) of the premium cost without returning any 
accumulation as set forth above. 
In the event an employee does not return any accumulation, as set 
forth above, for additional percent of health insurance premium paid by 
the Employer, that accumulation shall be paid to the employee in the 
first (1st) pay period following separation or retirement. However, in 
the event that an employee exceeds 175 days, he/she would be paid 
for all accumulated paid leave not returned. 
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The ALJ found each of the demands to be a mandatory subject of negotiation 
because each of the proposals implicate paid leave, which is compensation, and 
therefore a term and condition of employment that is mandatorily negotiable. 
The Village argues in exceptions and brief that the PBA proposals provide a 
contractual benefit that enables an employee to accumulate unused leave and, upon 
retirement, convert the unused leave credits into additional health insurance for both the 
retiree and his/her dependents. The Village finds this concept objectionable because it 
extends the benefit beyond the term of any interest arbitration award or collective 
bargaining agreement and because it also extends the benefit to dependents. It is for 
these reasons that the Village argues the demands are nonmandatory. 
Section 201.4 of the Act defines "terms and conditions of employment" as 
"salaries, wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment provided, 
however, that such term shall not include any benefits provided by or to be provided by 
a public retirement system, or payments to a fund or insurer to provide an income for 
retirees, or payment to retirees or their beneficiaries. No such retirement benefits shall 
be negotiated pursuant to this article, and any benefits so negotiated shall be void." 
The PBA contends that our prior decision in Incorporated Village of Lynbrook 
(hereafter, Lynbrook)2 is dispositive of the issues. We agree. In Lynbrook Police 
Benevolent Association,3 the PBA submitted certain demands to interest arbitration that 
the Village considered nonmandatory. One such demand concerned hospitalization 
210 PERB H3065 (1977), revd in part, 64 AD2d 902 (2d Dept 1978), modified Matter of 
Incorporated Vil. of Lynbrook v New York State pub. Empl. Relations Bd.,48 NY2d 398, 
12PERBH7021 (1979). 
3
 10 PERB H3067(1977). 
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benefits for an employee or a retired employee or his immediate family at the time of his 
demise. The demand proposed that the same hospitalization benefits be received by 
the beneficiaries of retired employees. We agreed in that case that the Village had no 
statutory duty to negotiate for persons who were no longer public employees at the time 
of negotiations.4 The Village objected to continuing the hospitalization benefit to be 
received by current employees who die after they retire on the theory that it is a 
prohibited retirement benefit under §201.4 of the Act. We rejected this argument and 
analogized it to the issue of termination pay decided in the Incorporated Village of 
Lynbrook case.5 There the Board distinguished supplements to pension payments, 
which are prohibited subjects of bargaining under §201.4, from termination pay, like the 
hospitalization benefit, which is a deferred payment for actual services rendered. 
On appeal, the Appellate Division, Second Department, confirmed PERB's 
determination regarding termination pay, however, it dismissed that part of the PBA's 
demand proposing the hospitalization benefit on the grounds that such proposal 
constituted retirement benefits and was, thus, a prohibited subject of negotiation. The 
Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division's decision regarding the hospitalization 
benefit. The Court noted that: 
[PERB] could have reasonably concluded that this item, 
which is becoming an increasingly common term of 
employment in this country, [citation omitted] constituted 
neither "payments to a fund or insurer to provide an income 
for retirees" nor "payment to retirees or their beneficiaries."6 
4
 Id., at 3121. 
5
 Supra, note 2, at 3115 (1977). 
6
 Matter of Incorporated VII. of Lynbrook v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 48 
NY 2d at 406 (1979). 
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The Court stated that since the purpose of §201.4 was to insulate public employers from 
pension demands, the bargaining process itself provides a similar safeguard and there 
is no constitutional prohibition from abrogating such benefits in future contract years.7 
While we have recognized the potential policy implications resulting from the Lynbrook 
decision,8 we are obliged to follow it. 
The ALJ also correctly noted that under the "conversion theory" articulated by the 
Board in City of Cohoes (hereafter, Cohoes), the demands seek to modify existing 
terms of the parties' expired agreement and, as such, are mandatorily negotiable.9 The 
Village urges us to reverse our decision in Cohoes on policy grounds because of the 
burden it places on public employers. We need not address this argument because, as 
the Court in Lynbrook opined, there is no constitutional prohibition from abrogating such 
benefits in future contract years. We leave to the parties and, perhaps the legislature, 
to address the "open-ended escalation factors" affecting health care costs for both 
public employers and public employees. 
In reaching our conclusion that the aforementioned demands are mandatory 
subjects of negotiations, we are not deciding the merits of the demands, only their 
negotiability. Our decision herein should be construed only as a determination that the 
demands may properly be submitted to interest arbitration. 
B
 27 PERB H3058(1994). 
9
 See City of Cohoes, 31 PERB 1J3020 (1998), confirmed sub nom Uniform Firefighters 
of Cohoes Local 2562 v. Cuevas, 32 PERB 1J7026 (Sup Ct, Albany County, 1999), affd 
276 AD2d 184, 33 PERB 1J7019 (3d Dept 2000), motion for leave to appeal denied, 96 
NY2d 711, 34 PERB 1J7018 (2001). 
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Based on the foregoing, the Village's exceptions are denied and the ALJ's 
decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: December 19, 2005 
Albany, New York 
<^U 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/ John T. Mitchell, Member 
1AC&CU^I.*^^-*&-^~7 
